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Transitions

by: SusanC

Tue Sep 25, 2007 at 00:06:39 AM EDT


( - promoted by SusanC)

Last Thursday, September 20th, 2007, I received news that Rajeev Venkayya, MD, has resigned from his post as Senior Director for Biodefense at the White House Homeland Security Council, a position that put him in charge of development of the US government's policy towards preparing for and mitigating the consequences of an influenza pandemic. 
SusanC :: Transitions
Exactly a year to the day before that, on September 20th 2006, I was in an Institute of Medicine Workshop on Ethical and Legal Considerations in Mitigating Pandemic Disease, when Harvey Fineberg, M.D., Ph.D., President of the IOM, gave a powerful and inspiring speech urging scientists and physicians to rise to the occasion, when called upon, to speak truth to power on the dangers and consequences, the knowns and unknowns, the tremendous number of difficult issues around influenza science, our medical and public health responses, the inadequacy of our institutions and resources, the economic and policy implications, the ethical and legal dilemmas - in short, all the challenges that we face when planning for an influenza pandemic.

It was the first time I attended such a meeting.  It was also the first time I got in front of a microphone and spoke on issues of policy to government officials.  Looking back, I believe that were it not for Dr Fineberg's moving and powerful encouragement, I would not have had the courage to stand up and speak on that day, and I would not have done half the things that I've done, nor spoken nor written on half the issues that I've worked on in the past year. 

His query was this,

When it comes time to speak, are we able to say what tptb need to hear, for the benefit of mankind, rather than what they want to hear?  Will we let our fear of their displeasure, our concerns over our jobs, our funding prospects, perhaps the anger of our colleagues, stop us from telling the truth, the whole unvarnished truth, and nothing but the truth?  Will we be ashamed of our inadequacies as men and women of science, such that we feel compelled to put up the face of false confidence, and pretend that we DO know what we are talking about, when in fact we don't?  Will we be able to rise to what is demanded of us, and put the wellbeing of our fellow countrymen front and center, but do so at a time when such actions are derided and the world is asleep to the danger, when opposing the tide of opinion is going to be our daily chore?  Will we be willing to risk our personal fortune for an illusive goal somewhere in the unknown future?
It was, is, a tall order.  It was a gauntlet thrown upon those of us who had the honor to be in the room that day. 

It was something utterly unforgettable.

Were it not for that one moment of inspiration, when I raised my hand and was called upon to be the first person to speak after Dr Fineberg, when I shared with the room how SARS killed 300 people in Hong Kong, brought that rich and well-run city to a standstill, caused a sharp drop in GDP and massive unemployment, that a 1918-like pandemic would kill 35,000 in the same timeframe, and that I cannot imagine how a public health crisis 100 times more severe than the most severe one known to that city can possibly be dealt with with any conventional public health measures on the books, and that therefore I would suggest that we need to sweep all our books off of our tables and start from a clean slate, to approach the problem as if we have never known any other public health crises before, and strive to find new and novel ways of mitigating such a disaster - were it not for that one moment that lit a spark somewhere in the deepest part of my being, I would not have had the fortune to walk that strange and uplifting path that I did in this past year.

That path was trodden, that part of my personal history has been written, in the past year, and much of that was documented within these diaries, to be shared with all who care to look.

But, at the risk of stating the obvious, speaking truth to power presupposes there IS some entity, some person in power who is on the receiving end of what is being spoken.  Someone who is willing to listen, when they are not required to listen.  Someone who is personally well assured of a brilliant future and yet strives to go beyond what is required of his office, to try and do better, to find that extra piece of insight, to discover that extra source of talent, to bring on board yet another perspective and try on what each has to offer.  To surpass even himself everyday, but not for any other reason than the humanity and the vision that reside within.

I was not aware of it then, but the IOM was again the venue for my great awakening, when in the second meeting I went to, something in what I spoke about, of bereaved parents and the duties of those who hold office, struck those in the room as extraordinary and profound.  And yet, it was not, to me.  It was nothing more than a bit of folk wisdom, a bit of mommy-wisdom.

The point is, how many leaders would have taken notice of something spoken by an unknown woman walking in from off the street, however profound, and acted on it?  How many would have forgotten it after that transient moment "oh, geez, she's right."?  How many would have continued to encourage input and participation from someone unaffiliated, without the right credentials, with nothing more than the power of words, to hold tptb accountable - how many of those in power would have done the opposite, tried to avoid and ignore such 'unprofessional' and unsolicited input, and breathed a sigh of relief, of "good riddance" when that person is silenced?

The kind of leadership that Dr Venkayya has demonstrated, in the short time that I've had the honor to be aware of it, is not the kind that puts one in any Halls of Fame.  Much of what I do know, of his vision and his passion, is known only intuitively and not explicitly, simply by reason of the necessities of his office.  And yet, ignorant as I was, and still am, I can easily imagine another in the same position who would have worn the word with a capital L, and gone around displaying it for all the world to see, instead of quietly and with humility stood and listened for yet another piece of feedback, of where and how he/we might do better, in this great and important work that is bigger than any one of us. 

It might have been me who had the courage, some would say the gumption, to stand up and speak truth to power, but were it not for Dr Venkayya's vision and ability to grasp the moment, I could easily have said exactly the same things and we would have passed each other like two ships in the night, and I would not have had the opportunity to play a part, however minor and transient, in helping to tackle one of the toughest challenges ever thrown to humanity.  And many on our forum who would never have dreamt that what they thought could possibly be important, would have never become empowered to go forth and be leaders in their community. 

It was an honor like no other, and I am truly humbled by it.

This was/is leadership at its most profound, leadership that seeks the betterment of others not oneself; it is the embodiment of an idea that is unspoken but lived, so unconsciously and naturally that I'm not sure he is aware of it, the idea of empowerment of the individual, the idea that the lowest and most insignificant amongst us can and do make important contributions to the wellbeing of society, and that bringing them into the dialogue is the most important thing we can possibly do to help a community stand on its own feet, to become resilient in the face of catastrophe. 

It is the kind of vision that the world needs.

It is an idea whose time has arrived.

I pray that we see more of the same, in whoever follows Dr Venkayya's footsteps.

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Transitions | 102 comments
well written
and very personal post. We can all hope for the same.

thanks, but it is more than personal.
It is about the kind of leadership that we need, what Dr Fineberg spoke of and what Venkayya demonstrated, if the world were to have any fighting chance, of surviving a pandemic with societies relatively intact.

I'm not sure it's the kind that is easy to find.  I just hope that we will be pleasantly surprised, and that what I wrote of here will be surpassed in the near future.

There is not a lot of time, to do what needs to be done.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
some great comments from
Dave Pollard on salon.com, on leadership and bottom-up strategies

http://blogs.salon.c...

Preparing for Emergencies the Wrong Way: A great thread in the FluWiki explains that top-down institutional plans for emergencies (as we saw with Katrina) will inevitably fail. Social and environmental phenomena like health and natural disasters are complex phenomena, and simplistic solutions cannot work because it is impossible to predict the severity, locations or public reactions to them. Only community-based, bottom-up, self-managed approaches that involve, self-educate and rehearse reactions to such emergencies will work.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
from the ideas
expressed by Vanderwagen, Lawler, and Nabarro in the Katrina conference, I would suggest that leadership from career professionals at the national and international level is far from absent.  What is needed is leadership from the political elite, those who make the ultimate decisions, hold the power of veto over the voices of professionals and subject matter experts.

The problem is election cycles are too short.  To make educating and preparing the public for a pandemic is not something that can be achieved with a 10-second soundbite message.  Right now, pandemic preparedness is not a vote-winner.  And that's the same in every country.

How can we turn this around? 

THAT is the tough task ahead of us, for those of us who care. 



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Every candidate is or will soon be out in the country campaigning
There are public forum debates being held...campaign events.  People need to show up and ask the candidates questions about what the would do to assure there is adequate pandemic preparedness at the local level.  Recent presidental debates have taken questions posted on u-tube.  They need to have this brought up multiple time.  Each presidential candidate has a campaign headquaters and advisory staff on the issues.  The issue can be raised with them. 

If you have a party affiliation invite your candidate of choice (this could work for Congressional, state or county races) to a fund raiser in your community or you can help someone who is planning a fundraiser get the word out - then show up and talk to the candidate about the issue or ask questions as part of the discussion.

A few ideas.


[ Parent ]
we could have a wikipage with ideas on "how to move this", linked to from the main pages of all sites


You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
actually, we should revamp this page!
http://www.fluwikie....

It's linked from the main page http://www.fluwikie.... with "# I'm ready to help  - what can I do?" and is severely outdated: "last modified on June 18, 2006, at 07:35 AM by DemFromCT"

The content should be more like ... quite a lot of things.  We need to think about it a bit ... here.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
it is perhaps no coincidence
that both Adm Vanderwagen and David Nabarro at the Katrina conference spoke of empowerment, of local community stakeholders.

Both of these leaders have had extensive experience in large scale disaster response, such as the tsunami in Asia.  The lesson that they came away with, the message that they brought to the conference, was consistently the importance of understanding that when the external assistance and response draws to a close, it is the locals who still have the hard work to do, for years and years, to put communities back together again.

The lesson that they also communicated, was that it doesn't matter how good and how intentioned your program is, if it is not compatible with the life-styles or beliefs of those who live in the community, it will not take root.

And that is not any different from the experience gleaned from the Redefining Readiness study, that we discussed in this diary, on what is missing from the federal plans

It is therefore vitally important for those in the ASPR office writing up Federal programs for State implementation for pandemic or all hazards planning, to ensure that close and direct participant of the public, down to the level of individual private citizens, both by way of information sharing and in receiving and incorporation of feedback, is mandated as part of the requirement for federal funds.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


What empowerment means, in pandemic preparedness
This is about creating bottom-up strategies that will enhance and complement the existing top-down approaches.  It is about extensive and two-way public engagement.

It is about making the public case that personal and family preparedness has to take place, that the family unit is just as important a funcional and economic unit as any business, such that they need to be assisted  and empowered to make COOP plans, just as businesses have been assisted and empowered by government up to now.

In the context of implementation of CMG measures, it is about helping people understand

  • that their individual risk of infection is related to the number of close contacts,
  • that the density of environments eg schools is far more important than the distance traveled,
  • that reducing the average number of close contacts of the whole community is more protective to an individual than unco-ordinated attempts at self-isolation,
  • that zero risk is impossible
  • but significantly reduced risk to the most vulnerable eg children can be achieved if we decide collectively to take responsibility in making it happen,
  • that resources freed by school dismissal can be used creatively to mitigate many problems if we put our minds to it, and
  • that ultimately each person's wellbeing is dependent on the wellbeing of their neighbors. 




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
the lessons from Katrina
were many and important.  The institutional issues eg around the National Response Framework that needed to be addressed are complex, as explored in this series of diaries.

But as we also saw, from the discussions arising from that series, many of these issues are not easily amenable to solution.

  • With the best will in the world, institutional changes take many years to bear fruit, if at all,

  • Such changes also tend to create new and often unforeseeable problems that will only manifest themselves at the next disaster, and most importantly

  • There are severe limits to the flexibility of bureaucracies, not least because of
    • rigid institutional rules,
    • real or perceived liability issues,
    • inherent stresses from competing institutional needs,
    • institutional culture - the inability or reluctance of officials to think creatively and act on what is needed rather than what the book says

    just to name a few.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
systemic failures in a pandemic
We know that any system is always going to be only as strong as the weakest link, but a pandemic can create such a complex interlocking and/or cascading set of consequences that
  • it's hard to know either ahead of time or when it is unfolding where and when the weak links may break,
  • multiple mild degradations of capabilities plus 1 or 2 minor but critical failures in a complex interdependent environment can result in (again possibly unpredictable) catastrophic and/or cascading failures and therefore
  • the more entities that exist between those who put together the policies originally and the end-users, the more likelihood exists of breakdowns along the way that will result in complete failure to deliver help to the end-user.

All this we (and leaders like Venkayya) may understand intuitively, but I am particularly indebted to Dr James Lawler, standing in for Venkayya, for putting forward a theoretical construct that vocalizes the issues and may help us to both visualize the problem and perhaps find solutions.

He spoke of pandemic as an example of complex adaptive systems.  The metaphor that he used, came from the work of Per Bak, Chao Tang and Kurt Wiesenfeld ("BTW") on self-organizing criticality, the metaphor of the sandpile - that if you visualize slowly trickling grains of sand onto a flat surface to create a sandpile, as the pile gets bigger, every now and then, you will get small and sometimes big avalanches, and occasionally a massive avalanche such that the whole pile collapses.  The problem is, it is impossible to predict at which point in time this is going to occur, which extra grain of sand dropped onto the pile, is going to cause 'the next big one'. 

Pandemics, or epidemics, alongside earthquakes, landslides, solar flairs, financial markets, are all examples of such systems with self-organized criticality, ie the complexity observed emerged in a robust manner that did not depend on finely-tuned details of the system, implying also that efforts at manipulating those details will not affect the overall criticality, or it's unpredictability. 

This is an important lesson for policymakers, that however well-structured and implemented, systematic top-down approaches to pandemic mitigation may have benefits at a microscopic or local level, but the bigger picture, the macroscopic criticality of the system cannot be mitigated by such means.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
lessons from Flu Wiki
Such models of complex adaptive systems are also analogous to scale-free networks, where the structure and dynamics of the network are independent of the network size, ie the network will function in the same way no matter what size it is.

If pandemics bear the characteristics of such complex adaptive systems, then government, with its rigid structure and hierarchical (as opposed to networked) nature, is a poor model from which to find solutions for the systemic catastrophes that are likely to occur. As Lawler said, complex adaptive problems need complex adaptive solutions.

The example that immediately comes to mind, of just such a network or system, is the FW community, on this forum.  Let me try and de-construct the nature and characteristics of this community here... ;-)

Since I was a late-comer to FW, I cede all claims of vision to the original founders.  But I can identify a few (probably not all) components in our forum rules that created a system that by default guides and nurtures newcomers on a process of interactive learning so that, even though we have a wide variety of opinions (and rightly so), the level of knowledge of the average participant is quite astounding even to professionals.  (We are now increasingly hearing anecdotes from those who have met 'the FW mom who knows everything'!) 

A few features come to mind. 

  1. By defining a loose set of boundaries and a small no of discouraged subjects eg politics, religion, or firearms, we create enough definition to be a community with a purpose but with enough diversity for valuable exchange of idea.

  2. By making everyone accountable for what they post ie unsubstantiated assertions are rapidly challenged by others, we discourage the worst of rumor-mongering and conspiracy theorists while continuing to improve the quality of content through such collective scrutiny and guardianship of the material. 

  3. Paradoxically, by allowing rumors and speculations as long as they are labeled as such, we encourage cross-fertilization of creative ideas and solutions.

What this creates is a community of inquisitive, passionate people, who over time have developed the meta-capability of evaluating increasingly complex information that they come across. 

If we can assist and empower increasing numbers of people in this way, think of what a resource they can be at the local level in a pandemic!

The other important feature is the absence of hierarchy or gatekeepers to information. Everyone gets the same information, no one's word is worth more than anyone else's, there are no stupid questions, and, except for crowd control purposes, the moderators do not have the final say on any subject. Because the system is built horizontally not vertically, any one of us or a whole bunch of the most knowledgeable can leave, and the system would not fall apart. 

The system is also fundamentally most empowering to those who would normally be the most clueless and therefore most hesitant to participate - it forces us to share the responsibility of trying to explain even the most difficult concepts to the slowest, to remain constantly connected to the needs of the next newbie, who is essentially  your walk-in joe public. 

This automatically ensures that our conversations remain relevant to what will actually happen in a pandemic for real people in real situations.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that, contrary to most 'expert' or official opinion, we on this forum have found that most people are teachable, that almost anyone with moderate level of literacy can over time accumulate an impressive understanding of the nature, consequences, and strategies for mitigation for a pandemic, for themselves, their families, as well as their community.

The rules of engagement are not complex and are reproducible.  What is needed is political will.  As long as leaders view policy development as a top-down process to be conducted within the walls of government, they will not be able to create the conditions needed on the ground, the types of complex adaptive models needed at the lowest jurisdictional level, that will interact in ways that have any hope of matching the nature and mitigating the effects of a catastrophe such as a pandemic.

THAT is the kind of lessons that Venkayya's leadership represents.  And it is no more nor less true than all the others that I have spoken about in the past year.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
preparedness and response - two kinds of leadership?
Perhaps the stuff leaders are made of will be different now and later.  (I suggest we forget about 6 stages: it's just preparedness and response.  Or maybe we need a completely different map.)

"Preparedness" needs what we've seen and more.  I don't know how to define it, but my fuzzy perception is we make it happen together, so each of us has some of "it".  (You can cut it when it's dead, but right now I don't know.)

And maybe "response" will need a different set of skills.  Thinking of it in practical terms, What makes or breaks the "St Louis vs Philly" difference?  Each of us will fight for the right options - but will there be enough of us?

I say this because maybe some effort (in parallel with "preparedness") should be directed at facilitating the emergence of good "response leadership".  Or maybe not?  How do we see that?

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
which brings me back to an unnoticed (to me) diary
http://www.newfluwik...

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
Response preparedness
I think right now you start setting the stage for response preparedness at least the Philly vs St. Louis part.

I will soon give a presentations and to colleges and my last points/closing is: It is is real; It is overdue; it will not be business as usual; once it starts it will be out of control; it will spread very rapidly; you must be prepared to act immediately and get students home; you will be held responsible--Plan now for action

Now post outbreak response on a broader scale is difficult to gauge it will depend on how far systems  and society breakdown. It also depends on how capable local leadership is - some people collapse in the face of crisis.  One amazing thing about crisis is often natural leaders emerge and calm, unify and lead. 

My county has had televised pandemic public discussions, done outreach to underserved communities, outreach to local business, and schools - sent out comprehensive brochues.  I think though we need to make it a person/citizen to person discussion that is why I recommend civic groups taking it on.


[ Parent ]
Where is the public engagement?
Preparedness and response need to be connected, for sure.  And of course your point about 'response leadership' is well taken.  But the thing is, leadership at the local level needs to be nurtured.  It is not something that can arise spontaneously, in the absence of information and knowledge..

Cos right now, the biggest need, is still dissemination of information to the public.

In the same IOM meeting that Dr Fineberg spoke at, public engagement emerged as an important issue.  There was recognition that this was critical to the success of disaster response but particularly in large scale events like pandemics. 

Here's an excerpt from the Workshop report published by the National Academies (readable online for free)

Civic Engagement

Throughout the workshop, the public perspective dominated discussions of pandemic ethics, as reflected in presentations that advocated transparent planning processes and clear communication. But transparency is not enough, Capron said. The process should also adhere to the principle of participation, which holds that stakeholders (and who is not a stakeholder in a pandemic?) should contribute to the process of formulating objectives and adopting policies (see also Chapter 4).

As previously described, public participation has been incorporated in pandemic planning efforts undertaken by both PAHO and CDC (see Mujica et al., page 66, and Cetron and Landwirth, page 99). Faden noted that among prior attempts to engage the public in health policy making (concerning such issues as resource rationing, end-of-life care, and genetic screening), some of the most successful efforts were those that occurred on a scale that was sufficiently local that people were able to voice their individual concerns. When society wrestles with issues that affect people's daily lives, Capron said, people generally want the chance to participate in the "work of worrying." They don't always act on it, he said, "but they often miss it when they don't have it." Susan Chu, who moderates the public Internet forum FluWiki, observed that its participants exhibit a high level of engagement and sophistication. Asserting that at least "a portion of the public is teachable," Chu encouraged policy makers to speak truthfully about the possible effects of a pandemic and to enlist citizen engagement in the planning efforts.

A whole year has gone by, after I said those words.  I'd like to ask tptb, if there is still anyone listening out there, Where is the public engagement?

In the one year that I've paid attention to this issue, the US government has achieved many things.  I do acknowledge there were some attempts at public engagement, such as the HHS blog.  Sure, it was useful in many ways, primarily perhaps in making officials and community leaders aware that there is a group of well-informed citizens who are committed to the issue of helping society prepare. 

But if, by public engagement we mean informing the public of the challenges that a pandemic will bring, and how to prepare for it, I must say that it was a dismal failure, to the extent that for all intents and purposes the 'public' who were engaged in that exercise were much more well informed than the government, and that a genuine dialogue was ever established. 




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
if tptb want stability and compliance
for their policies in a pandemic, they would do well to take the advice of experts like Capron (above):
some of the most successful efforts were those that occurred on a scale that was sufficiently local that people were able to voice their individual concerns.

When society wrestles with issues that affect people's daily lives, Capron said, people generally want the chance to participate in the "work of worrying" They don't always act on it, he said, "but they often miss it when they don't have it

The last sentence is IMHO the most important point, that irrespective of whether people follow advice on preparing, the fact that they have been informed and have been given the chance to make choices about what affects them, means that if and when a disaster actually happens, there will be much less bewilderment and sense of betrayal that would have happened if they were never told.

In a disaster as severe and prolonged as a pandemic, that last, the collective judgment of the public as to whether tptb have fulfilled their responsibility, whether their misfortunes are an 'act of God' or something that could have been prevented had they been told about it, is likely to make the critical difference between a difficult pandemic and a catastrophic breakdown of societal functions.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Disaster Capitalism at work?
As another perspective on why citizen engagment/citizen preparation has not caught on - I wonder if Naomi Klein's concept of 'disaster capitalism' might be in play?

if tptb want stability and compliance ...

According to an article of Klein's in the current Harpers "Disaster Capitalism: The new economy of catastrophe"  your assumption's accuracy may depend on which of TPTB you are talking about. 

It raises some interesting points about the privatization of governmental duties (including traditional governmental or even nonprofit roles in responding to disasters) and about the hollowing out of government's ability and/or willingness to respond. 

We tend to overlook the kind of sea-change that challenges the fundamental underpinnings that we accept as a given - such as government's responsibility for playing some kind of substantive role in responding to or preparing for a disaster or its obligation to encourage individual citizens to prepare and respond.  We also tend to under-appreciate the impact that changes in such fundamental underpinnings can have.

There are currents at work in our national culture that may have unexpected off-shoots - and these may be affecting how and if citizen engagement is being promoted.

Warning - semipolitical content. Proceed at your own risk and if possible - read with a screen to keep substantive content while agreeing to disagree with political slant.

While the current Harper's article is not yet available, it proceeds along the same path described in some of her previous works:

http://www.zmag.org/...
http://www.thenation...
http://www.thenation...

Mods - if this is too far over the line please feel free to delete.

ITW(Joel J)
Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear - not absence of fear.
- Mark Twain
 


[ Parent ]
Not sure I believe she can be objective on the topic
Maybe an interesting idea but not sure she is the one I would trust to write the story.  Went to her site everything she writes carries the same theme regardless of the topic.  Further she seems to want to reduce everything to corporate greed, globalization and bad government.  Nice scapegoats but not quite that simple.  I would say more but would offend someone on the right or left.  Either my screen wasn't thick enough, I'm one of the evil empire or she is a bit biased.  Its a multiple choice but I don't think I would recommend her book to explore the topic.

[ Parent ]
well, it's always easier
to suggest evil than to offer solutions.  Whole industries are made out of pandering to people's desires to find who or what is at fault.  Generally it doesn't help us find solutions, which is where I'm at....



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
It was the idea that caught my interest.
Either my screen wasn't thick enough, I'm one of the evil empire or she is a bit biased.

Don't forget "D. All of the above."  ;^)  j/k

I agree it is never that simple and she obviously has an agenda she is strongly pushing.  While having an agenda doesn't mean a writer is necessarily wrong, it can shade what they say sometimes to the point of obscuring it.

It always seems to be a toss-up between people who write objectively while putting most folk to sleep and people who write deeply into the 'rant' mode, who can interest people in new perspectives, but often loose credibility with all but the choir. 

Things like this are always more complex than can be really described in an article, or even a book, but I like to take in new concepts and perspectives from folks around the edges (from many sides) to see whether the base of their argument might have merit even if all of their conclusions or characterizations don't. 

Sometimes the only way to gain perspective on the forest is to listen to folks beyond the tree-line. 

Thanks for the look-see, comment and review. 

ITW(Joel J)
Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear - not absence of fear.
- Mark Twain
 


[ Parent ]
let me share an insight
which is slightly off-topic.  Most people think if they've identified a cause for a problem, that is where they will find solutions, cos if you fix the cause, you're all set, right?

Wrong.  The relationship is not that simple.

Let me give you a very simple analogy.  Let's say, smoking causes lung cancer.  That's a cause, or one of many causes.  But when someone already has lung cancer, does taking away the cause solve the problem?  The answer is No.

Similarly, globalization, or whatever, might be the cause or one of many causes (I like to think of them as contributing factors) of many ills.  But reversing globalization does not solve the ills, in fact it may create more.  Same with dictatorships.  Does allowing full democracy and free speech solve problems that were created by a prior dictatorship?  Again, no.  Because there are important social institutions and norms that need to be built before democracy and free speech can be let loose without destabilizing society.

The moral of that story, at least for me, is finding fault is good fun, but it's not where you need to look to find solutions.

Where you need to look is, well, finding solutions, and save your energy on finding faults.  ;-)



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
having said that
the problem is, most people are intellectually lazy and morally superior.  And they like to be told they are right.

Hence one can get really popular at ranting at all the real and perceived evils or causes of problems in the world.  Those who are only focused on finding solutions, because they have to ask so many tough questions, of themselves and of the 'victims', often end up being derided and blamed, for losing moral exactitude.

You don't always get gratitude for finding solutions.  In fact, it's rather rare, most of the time, cos the solutions to tough problems are usually really tough solutions as well...



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Diagnosis before (and during) treatment?
While people can and do get stuck in finding fault, if you don't identify the barriers that may exist to progress, if you don't identify what interests may be working at cross purposes, you may not be able to devise strategies to achieve your own goals. 

Sometimes you need to go back and refine the diagnosis before sucessful treatment can be planned and implmented.

There is point somewhere between 'just do it' and 'what's the problem' that gives maximum benefit - and it ususally tilts towards the 'just do it' end of the continuum.  But when 'just do it' isn't getting it done, sometimes it is useful to step back and ask why.

ITW(Joel J)
Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear - not absence of fear.
- Mark Twain
 


[ Parent ]
i think it's a matter of assigning limited time to each part of the procedure
i.e., some time to find what's wrong, some time to find ways around it, some time to summarise, some time to think what to do next ...  Just be aware what gear your car is using, and change if needed. (not my own wisdom, btw)

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
Trouble shooting the problem
Requires not only looking at the flaws in the system but also possible flaws in our approach.  Why aren't we getting results. Reality is there are problems with the system - many have done an excellant job finding where plans and messages break down.  That is important because it helps focus us on where the most work needs to be done. 

With regard to our approach - the intitial effort was to simply tell people that they needed to prepare but as many will attest, frequently those they contacted didn't want to know or care.  No doubt that is frustrating. 

I have followed the fluwiki from the other forum to this one (close to two years).  While there was a lot of information - it has been a great resource and clearinghouse - there has been little attention to coordinated efforts to affect change. This is not intended to discount anyones efforts (Susan, Dem and others have worked very hard to represent us).

There is a saying ""how do you eat an elephant - one bite at a time."  But instead of focusing on the elephant we have often been trying to take on the whole jungle.  That is easy to do with a task so daunting but it is rarely effective.

Some have avoided political action for fear it would become partisan (never useful) but coordinated political action need not be partisan. 

The petition, questions for candidate are the beginnings of coordiated bites at the elephant (not a reference to a political party).  They serve two purposes they focus on specific things we want and they direct a coordinated political action. 

In order for an evaluation to be effective it must look not only outward but also inward.


[ Parent ]
coordinated efforts to effect change
requires a number of people who are committed beyond helping their local communities, which many on this forum has been doing.  While I support everyone's efforts and understand that many have limitations as to what they can do, still, the issue is real.  Local action will help somewhat but it is the overall paradigm shifts at the national and global level that IMHO will make the biggest difference.

For example, just take this idea of empowerment, at the lowest jurisdictional level.  ie the recognition that it is no longer enough to plan centrally and roll out policies top-down.  This is a NEW notion that leaders have only just started to try out and are still very hesitant in presenting.

Imagine one day this becoming the global consensus, that the most important thing governments can do is to inform and educate individual citizens, and bring them onboard for ideas that can help sustain community resilience, in ways that only people thinking as private individuals living in communities know how.

THAT is the kind of big-picture goal that we need to keep in mind.  I don't know whether it is possible to coordinate a lot of activities at this point, at least petitions is one way to start.  But I believe it is important that all of us begin to shift our thinking.  Yes, responses are local, but changes need to be made with much wider geographic and political reach to REALLY benefit your local community.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
and yet, many details of how to move things globally have emerged from local "frustrations" (aka "learning experiences") [such is life]


You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
i.e. the "big paradigm shift" emerges from wheel-to-road friction, reflected upon as individuals and in conversations
it's scary, but also beautiful at times to watch

(ok, back to work!)

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
there are problems with
such piecemeal action.  You do need to have a good grasp of the big picture, what you think of the whole problem.  It is not enough to deal with pieces of it.  It's better than nothing, but as I wrote earlier in this thread, the scale-free nature of this problem is such that piecemeal solutions will have some limited local effect but will have no effect on the overall stability of the system.

That's why we need to deal with the problem as a whole too, like spartan says...



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
no, I'm not against FINDING any fault
I'm against "finding fault" as an activity in and of itself.  Particularly when fault = blame.

If you know what I mean... ;-)

And particularly when finding such fault or blame puts one into high moral gear rather than openness and willingness to understand the 'perpetrator's challenges, to see if there are ways to solve the problem.

There is a difference between seeing someone or some entity as BEING the problem vs HAVING the problem.




All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Or none of the above
There are always those chose who profit from someones misfortune and there are charities that have become more business than charity. In government it is a cycle of down size, up size, right size and contact out, bring in-house reinvent - nothing new there.  Business can often staff up and deploy in emergencies faster than government.  It can also short cut the tangle of regulations that apply to government agencies.  This is good when a disaster is on your hands and you can't spare a moment but it can also end up with cost overruns and abuse.  This debate has gone on for years and through multiple administrations.  As long as there are people there will be abuses.  It is not limited to the US or a result of corporate greed - human greed - yes, perhaps. 

I perhaps am selfish because my first priority is may families well being - deciding what I want to do for them and doing it.  I am comfortable that I have completed that phase to the best my capability and satisfaction.

Now I have time to contribute to this effort in hopes that others may plan for their own families and communities.  I don't work in the medical profession so I am unqualified to give any such advice.  I have little patience with the polictical rhetoric and conspiracy.  Oddly enough the political system is quite straight forward once you get past the noise.  This is something I do know something about. 

There is much to do...we need to get on with it.  That may mean that the system may not always be perfect or always to our liking but we are talking about surviving not a popularity contest. 

People need to take ownership and action - not curse the dark. 

That is the beauty of the system - warts and all.


[ Parent ]
Complexity means complex answers and individuals.
SusanC,

 During Katrina many IT departments either flexed their backup plans or their adventuresom spirits.

 Unlike Katrina, during the pandemic there will be no place to run. Pandmeic will not be a four or five day disaster followed by months of rebuilding. Months of disaster with longer recovery time is my opinion.

  There where ISPs that kept web cam and internet connections running even when told to leave. It was exciting to read.

 NOTE: SOS and AOS.
 SOS - software as a service. This means a web based application for multiple groups is hosted at one place. Yes it the main frame solution reborn. The problem is each locality free from thinking about the risks for someone else hosts the servers, software and IT folks. Yet one failure can bring down large areas.

 AOS - archetecture as a service or having someone host all your servers for you. Basicly the same problems as SOS but you get to load your own software. They manage the hardware.

 Like anything else - some geeks will band together and broadcast live not because the governemnt came and helped but they empowered themsevels.

Kobie


[ Parent ]
maybe complexity can be supplemented by simplicity - and
no, i don't know where this would take us

think http://hexayurt.com maybe?

and, of course, often complexity arises from simple rules as in http://www.wolframscience.com/

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
Lugon - both are cool sites
Lugon,

 The Hexayurt project is cool. Another solution using available materials.

 WolframTones reminds me of guy who feed dna sequences into a midi prgram and came up with music.

 Both projects help groups of people think outside the box and then share the results, good or bad, with others.

 Thanks,
Kobie


[ Parent ]
hexayurt is cool, and a good example of thinking "inside the box" ;-)


You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
"down to the level of" (pyramids and onions)
"Down to the level of individual private citizens".  There's this implicit up-down thing, which may mean that those who are "down" are also "at the root", but which also reminds me of the onion metaphor (as oposed to the pyramid metaphor):

What's important is what goes on in the inner core, while those who are further away from the center are ... well, away from the center, and helping as best they can, handing tools to those who do the work etc.

I heard this from an MD who considered himself at the center, together with those ill or at risk of becoming ill, while "all those planners" are sometimes really far away from the core.

Luckily, some planners "get it" and "cut right through", it seems!

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
yes, top-down
that is the existing structure.  I'm only mirroring it, in the sense that policymakers do work within that model.  They need to use that model to create other models, though.  That is the challenge.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
"use [own's] model to create another model" - tough fun! :-/
And can't be done without inter-action.

Thing is, can we accelerate it just a bit?  Or is it not a matter of speed but (dancing) skill?  How do we help each other to the next steps?  "Empower the empowerers" sort of thing?  (What I say is starting to sound silly, even to me.)

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
the stuff that leaders need to be made of
  what is required, at times of great strive, was the subject of much debate, during the weeks of the HHS leadership blog

The controversies that plagued the blogs and perhaps alienated many, also pushed many of us to explore issues beyond how many weeks preps, to look at the big picture, of what it means for us to consider whether someone has what it takes, the Leadership and Moral Courage to do what is right as well as what is necessary.

It was a journey of shared learning; I'm sure we on this forum were not the only ones who benefited from it.

The question is, will those in power, in positions of authority, now and in the future, be able to rise to the occasion, and overcome personal fears and reservations, as Dr Fineberg charged us to do? 


The jury is out, and for once I'm no longer as optimistic as my temperament normally takes me...





All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


if leaders won't take action
then citizens will.  We saw that in Katrina.  We will see that again, in every disaster, that it is the acts of private individuals that will put leaders to shame. 



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
speaking truth to power
is something that can be done in many ways, not just in front of a microphone.

Like here, in this petition to Senator Tom Harkin and members of the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


Example questions for candidates?
I have a very hard time distilling questions & concerns down to the point of being able to articulate them in a public forum.

My question for fellow flubies:
If you had an opportunity to ask a candidate for state office 1 question that would help further public discussion/awareness of the need for pandemic planning, what would it be?

(See, I even have a hard time distilling the question about the question down to a manageable length!)


People get to set up their questions, I hope. Being concise is tough,
because we can't assume any knowledge about pandemic.

Virologists and epidemiologists agree that an pandemic is likely and could start anytime.  Government agencies and businessmen have been discussing their plans for more than 2 years, but families have not been told, even though the Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt has spoken in every state, warning that when a pandemic happens, "You're on your own", because it will be like 5000 Katrinas.

What will you do to help prepare American families?

[Or]

Will you trust the American people to be mature enough to face reality before (we walk right into it)/(it smacks us upside the head)?

"The truth does not change according to our ability to stomach it."  Flannery O'Connor


[ Parent ]
how about this
Are you aware that if the H5N1 virus that has already killed 200 people becomes the next pandemic virus, it has to become 30 times (not 30%) weaker in order to match the severity of the 1918 pandemic, and that in such a scenario the CDC estimates it will kill 2 million Americans, and that 2 decades of normal child and adolescent deaths will happen in one season?

Can you tell us what you have done PERSONALLY to protect our children and grandchildren from such a catastrophe?



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
next one
Based on expert advice and scientific analysis of previous pandemics, the CDC has recommended, as best practice that will save the most lives, that communities should prepare NOW for up to 12 weeks of school closure to be implemented across a state as soon as the first cases appear either in that state or in one of its neighbors.  So far, states are taking their time, and no state pandemic plan has made a solid commitment to implement this recommendation. 

As President, what Federal incentives or penalties will you put in place to ensure that these life-saving measures will be properly implemented, and how urgently do you view this as a priority in your administration?



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
personal and family COOP plans
For at least 2 years, with bi-partisan support, the government has been in close discussions with business big and small, to urge and assist them to make Continuity of Operation plans in the event of supply chain failures in a pandemic, and yet nothing has been done to publicly and adequately advise and assist individuals and families to make similar plans.

To the extent that even financial markets pay attention to such things as consumer confidence, do you not view the family unit as important enough to deserve a similar level of advice and attention?  What will you do and when, to inform every single American family about their supply chain risks, and to assist them to make similar COOP plans as big business, or do you believe business activities will be self-sustaining in the absence of adequately prepared, calm, and confident consumers?



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
on vaccines
The following is a quote from Dr Margaret Chan, speaking at a meeting earlier this year http://www.who.int/d...

Experts have told us. They have long regarded vaccines as the most effective medical intervention for reducing morbidity and mortality during a pandemic. (but note the following 2 points as stated by Dr Chan.)

1. This assumption, which makes sense, has never been tested in practice.

2. A vaccine has never been available quickly enough after the start of a pandemic to test its impact on morbidity and mortality.

Here's my queation: Are you aware that today in the 21st century, the situation has not changed, and we cannot expect to have a vaccine within the first 6 months of a pandemic, long after the virus has swept across the country and killed many in its path?  Do you support the policy of spending billions of dollars on a countermeasure that won't be available in time to make a significant difference to the number of deaths for the majority of communities, while programs to educate and assist the public to prepare and build resilient communities have been strikingly absent on any appropriations bills?  What if anything do you intend to do to put saving American lives ahead of the interests of pharmaceutical and vaccine companies?



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Thank you Jane & SusanC
These are just what I was looking for.

[ Parent ]
Question for candidates.
Most experts around the world believe it is impossible to predict exactly when the next flu pandemic may occur, but they agree it is just a matter of time and that it could be severe.

Most pandemic preparedness plans in both government and  businesses all have a major problem.

They rely heavily on critical and time-sensitive actions being taken by  members of the general public.

The problem is that the public is neither aware of nor prepared for the vital role it has been given.

The sucess or failure of public participation in pandemic response could change mortality rates in the next pandemic by as much as ___%*.  Here in ___________, that could translate to ___________** lives - many of whom could be children and young adults.

So here's my question: What would you propose that this (State, County, City, Nation) do to ensure that the public is both aware of and prepared for its role in responding to a pandemic?

Explanation:
*
(I forget what the sucessful community mitigation impact was measured at for 1918, but am thinking it was close to 50% - anyone have that at their fingertips?)
**
(To fill in the blank of lives at stake for your area, multiply its general population total by 30% then by whatever case fatality rate (cfr) you are prepared to defend, then by the impact % for Community Mitigation. The CFR you select will be less apt to be challenged and distract from the main point if you use a CFR from your state or county or pandemicflu.org's "Severe 1918-like" 2.1% cfr. http://www.pandemicf...)

{For example in a city/county of 1 million x 30% = 300,000 cases x .021 = 6300 pandemic deaths.  If the CM impact % is 50%, that means over 3,150 lives are in the balance and could be saved. More than were lost on 9-11, more than US combat deaths in Iraq.  Just for that one city. And if we are talking about something that follows the path of H5N1, failure means that of those 3,150 - 50% would never reach 20 years old; over 75% would never reach 30 years old.)

ITW(Joel J)
Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear - not absence of fear.
- Mark Twain
 


[ Parent ]
should we wikify it? or pdf it? or both?


You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
community mitigation in 1918
cities that implemented multiple measures especially closures of schools and other public places early had a 50% reduction in peak mortality and 10-30% reduction in overall mortality compared to cities that didn't take action or acted late.

Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918 influenza pandemic , Hatchett, Mecher, and Lipsitch PNAS.

Discussed here Non-pharmaceutical Interventions - Lessons from 1918



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Impact % of Community Mitigation - Models
Did the Midas Computer Modelling show about the same?

ITW(Joel J)
Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear - not absence of fear.
- Mark Twain
 


[ Parent ]
more than that

Remember in 1918, the implementation was haphazard, and none of the cities implemented measures for more than 6 weeks consecutively.  When they lifted the measures, the numbers shot up.  They applied the measures again, there was a reduction, but it was no longer as effective cos the epidemic size was much bigger.

Check out this chart from Markel study in PNAS, discussed in this diary.  You can really see the correlation in time between the measures and the epidemic, especially school closure.


(Click to enlarge)





All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
That's an Community Mitigation Impact % of over 70%
I assume this slide is illustrating their projections for the entire pandemic period and not a peak period - correct? 

Taking the impact of NPI only (Community Mitigation through Non-Pharmecutical Interventions) you drop the illness rate from 42% to 11.6%.  That's a drop of over 70%.

So for purposes of my proposed Question, I would suggest using a range of between 50% and 70%. 

50% was the impact in 1918 during peak periods with inconsistent and relatively inefficient appliation of the mitigation efforts even in the best cities.

70% is the impact projected by the computer models being relied on by the government for their planning - for NPI alone.

Might want to bring the graph above and this graphto illustrate both points:
http://www.newfluwik...

ITW(Joel J)
Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear - not absence of fear.
- Mark Twain
 


[ Parent ]
yes, between 50-70% reduction
depending on early implementation and combining measures.  Those are the top issues, compliance is third.

And to put it in context, the use of antivirals, tamiflu in H5N1 has NOT shown evidence of reduction of mortality.  In instances when it's been used, it doesn't seem to have made a difference to mortality.  There is speculation that if we increase the dose and give it early enough, we may see better survival, but I very much doubt we are able to give it early enough, and there won't be enough for normal dose, let alone double dose and double duration, as is being suggested.

It's important to give the estimates of effectiveness of CMG in relation to other countermeasures available.  Looked at that way, there is no other countermeasure that comes even close to the ability of CMG to save lives.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Question on CMG priorities
Susan, I just put up this diary:

http://www.newfluwik...

It is my report (I won't call it a transcript, because I'm sure I didn't get every words and didn't try to) of yesterday's senate hearing on pandemic preparedness/state and local preparations.  I only listened to the first panel -- Vanderwagon from HHS and Jolly from DHS -- and I heard very little about CMG.

There weren't even any questions about the school issue... at all.. from the senators on the committee.  That surprised me, too.

I was quite surprised not to hear anything at all about kids, schools, how kids spread illness, spread etc.  It seems like if you are promoting CMG you would mention these things.  I thought early school closure was a big part of CMG.

Is there any OTHER part to Community Mitigation that would have as big an effect as closing schools and keeping kids home?  Do you or anyone have any idea why school closure wasn't even MENTIONED at this senate hearing?  (Or maybe it was in the second part -- I haven't gotten there yet....)

Pandemics are "Wicked Problems". - Average Concerned Mom


[ Parent ]
funding
I suspect the stuff they discussed (vaccines and antivirals for the part I was able to tune in) is where money is allocated.

[ Parent ]
well that makes sense
If you've been given a bucket of money, people want to know how it has been spent.

Pandemics are "Wicked Problems". - Average Concerned Mom

[ Parent ]
There's the rub
No money is allocated because no agency seems to acknowledge that it is their responsibility to assure that the public is aware and prepared to play their role in Pandemic Community Mitigation, so no one asks for any money to make sure it happens or to assist the public in making it happen.

Thus when these same agencies come before Congressional committees to report on how money is being spent by that agency (or how they would spend more money) the most effective counter-measure in defense against a pandemic gets almost no attention (and little or no money).

Which takes us back to at least one thing we can do about it: http://www.newfluwik...

For examples of what any one of a number of agencies could be doing (and spend money to do) we need look no further than some recent discussions of faith-based groups or a  discussion that took place some time ago concerning what a leading producer of electricity was doing to assure that the families of their employees would be prepared and able to weather the pandemic.

If 1/10000 of the money spent to prepare for a pandemic has been spent on supporting effective community mitigation I would be surprised.

And yet it could reduce mortality by between 50-70%. 

At some point you have to wonder why.

ITW(Joel J)
Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear - not absence of fear.
- Mark Twain
 


[ Parent ]
seems to me
it's HHS ASPR's job now.

[ Parent ]
% reduction - do we want to highlight this as an incentive?
To me, the incentive is more powerful with a bad-bad pandemic than with a merely-bad one.

I.e., if CFR is 10% more lives are saved than with a 5% CFR.  (Compliance depends on preparedness, too.)

Those figures could be computed locally, too.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
absolutely
I never did stop, it has always been the incentive



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Pandemic death estimate by age
SusanC,

 Hi. Great graphs. The TLC graph by the CDC really shows "people are the key."  

 Is there a projected H5N1 mortality rate by age graph for H5N1 like the WHO graph on the wiki home page?

 People have said to me "Nice chart, but their demographics are very different from U.S. or the U.K. It would not happen like that here."

Kobie


[ Parent ]
less children, so if one dies, he/she is noticed (more? i can't know)
http://www.newfluwiki2.com/sho... (Confluence of nightmares, by SusanC)

A child who dies means many years worth of life lost.  Not so with older people, and we all know it.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
yes, the link by lugon
confluence of nightmares



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Lugon - please help.
Lugon,
 Hi. SusanC mentioned a link to a graph showing projected deaths by age for upcomming pandemic.
 Well that is what I am looking for. I got a few negative responses from teh WHO one. They said "Well that is their country adn the U.S. demographics are differnt.

Thanks for any help.
Kobie


[ Parent ]
Duh - Lugon never mind just found "confluence of nightmares" n/t


[ Parent ]
Kobie, great, cos I found your Dec 14 2007 request on Feb 7 2008
Which, in panflu-prepping time, is a lifetime!

LOL

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
Lugon - wow you found something from December.
Lugon,

 Yes that is a life time. Thanks for posting. LoL

 These things happen. I am sure there are things I have not answered.

 Hmm - that is upgrade I would like to see. A box where people post questions to a user.

 Righ now, responses to the most reacent post is the best way to me.

Kobie


[ Parent ]
Cadidate question
AlohaOR,
 I hope this helps:

 The DoD, OSHA, CDC, and HHS have putforth federal guidlines for pandemic redyness.
 To ensure the same sucsess with pandemic as we had with Y2K, how have your checked on our readyness and how will you deal with those who do not prepare?

Kobie


[ Parent ]
Not sure where to post this
I don't know if this already exists here but if not here is the National Governors Assn. guidence for state officials.  Preparing for a Pandemic Influenza: A Primer for Governors and Senior State Officials 

http://www.nga.org/F...


More from Nat. Governors Assn. Slide presentation
Two part presentation may have material you can use for presentations

http://www.nga.org/F... 1

http://www.nga.org/F... 1


[ Parent ]
Fineberg
so, the trick is to choose words so how to increase the pandemic risk
perception of the audience.
To choose well formulated words and examples to describe the risk-factors
while leaving out those things which might cause complacency.
To list the negatives and omit the positives.

Not to quantify the risk scientifically (by assigning probabilities)
but just to increase the perceived risks, regardless of the possibility
to create overestimations.

> Virologists and epidemiologists agree that an pandemic is likely

how likely ? above which threshold becomes something "likely" ?

the same Fineberg wrote a book about swine flu 1976 :

...On odds of a pandemic they [doctors] refused to give Ford any number
beyond 1 to 99 percent
...The threat was never established
. . . in the absence of manifest danger, [inoculation] was a mistake
. . . since research has not yet found a good predictor of virulence,  one may
have no means to establish in advance the severity of a presumed pandemic

Richard E. Neustadt, Harvey V. Fineberg , The Epidemic That Never Was (1983)

http://www.setbb.com/fluwiki2/...

let's access the risk scientifically. That is : assign probabilities,
damage expectation values to it and discuss it with experts.
What Fineberg, Neustadt required in their book. What they
critisize about swine-flu 1976 although they made some
efforts. Other than what we see today concerning panflu.
("no one can estimate...")

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


there are systems where predictions ...
A bird stands on a tree branch.

- It defecates.  Physics science tells us where the stuff will land.
- A feather falls in windy weather.  It will reach the ground eventually.  Where exactly is essentially harder to predict.  It's not that we are fools or unwilling to predict.  It's that it is a different problem.
- The bird flies away.  That, again, is a whole other level of unpredictability.

Wheather forecasts offer, again, a different predictability problem.  If the weather is cold right now, it's easy to predict it will stay cold within the next hour.  Apparently the next few days are predictable, as is the next summer.  10 days from now is not always easy.

We see people predicting the next pandemic as a 100% event, with all the other details full of, my feeling, essential unpredictability.

And yes, there are psychosocial factors such as "I don't want to be proved wrong" etc.  Maybe because people treat a problem of one kind as if it were a problem of the other kind ("being an ignorant or an expert in denial for some kind of profit" versus "being a clever enough person, full of good generous intentions, who faces an essentially tough problem").

But some factors are essential to the problem domain.  I mean, this nut is essentially hard to crack.

It depends on what level of prediction we're talking about.  In the long run, 100%.  Within the next few minutes, just a bit above zero.  Within the time we need to get preparedness going: two high.

For me, it's back to prepping in the widest possible sense (i.e., not just household level).  Because even CFR=2% (or less) can do more harm than the energy I invest in preparedness.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
what's long run ?
our lifetime ? 100 years ? 1000 years ? million years ?
lifetime of our universe ?

with "pandemic" I assume you mean human influenza pandemic on earth.

It's hardly 100%, IMO not even 99%.

What would lugon say about the likelyhood of another cholera pandemics ?
or pestis pandemic Also 100% ?
Is cholera a bigger threat than influenza ?
Wikipedia gives 7 Cholera pandemics:
1816-1826,1829-1851,1852-1860,1863-1875,1881-1896,1899-1923,1961-1970s
looks like we are "due" to another one.

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
long term
past flu pandemics have been 10 to 50 years appart from each other

most recent one was 40 years ago

long term might be 10 years or around that, not 100 or 1000 years

it's not my lifetime, but our children's lifetimes (my take on it)

you say it's not even 99% and no, i won't ask you about your time period (i feel this conversation is not exactly productive right now, but that's a feeling and it too will pass)

cholera and pestis (and AIDS) are not respiratory, so quite different IMO

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
Fineberg --> Dowdle
Walter R. Dowdle wrote a review in 1996 about
"the 1976 experience"

http://www.journals.uchicago.e...

His main conclusion seems to be that risk assessment and
risk management should be separated.
He seems to credit Neustadt and Fineberg for bringing up
and first discussing this problem.

Abstract:
>  .. Strong consideration should be given to creating separate structures
> for risk assessment and risk management. Risk assessment
> estimates the probability of a pandemic, the options available
> for control, and the relative benefits of those options as situations
> change. Risk management is the political response to that assessment.

2nd last chapter:
> ...However, the formal process of risk assessment and risk
> management can be kept separate. A formal risk assessment
> structure is needed to provide independent scientific evaluation
> of the probability of a potential pandemic strain, the options
> available for control, the risks and benefits of those options,
> and the changes in those risks and benefits as the pandemic
> grows closer, or as the months go by and the pandemic doesn't
> come at all [1].

referrences:
> [1] Neustadt RE, Fineberg HV. The swine flu affair. Washington, DC: US
> Government Printing Office: US Department of Health, Education, and
> Welfare, 1978; Publication no. 017-000-00210-4.
> ...

I agree with Dowdle. We do need risk assessment.
We don't need "no one can predict..."
Let's form CDC-panels of experts to estimate the
magnitude of the danger in a scientific way,
as good as possible using the available data.

The unclearly worded risk statements by several experts
worldwide is not very useful and often confusing.

In the actual statements,interviews,talk-shows of Fineberg
I don't see much of the attitudes from his old articles and books.
Maybe these change, when people are actually in leading positions
themselves...


ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
risk assessment, risk management
Two different and useful hats, yes.

Wearing my "risk assessment" hat, I see this:
- Long term 100%.
- Mid term (next several months or few years) high enough.
- Short term I don't know and I honestly think I can't know.

Wearing my "risk management" hat, I see need for complex action, which I'm taking.

Gs, I think you favour more precise risk assessment as part of the needed action.

By all means go for it; I think it would be better (cleaner and maybe more effective) if you did it in one diary or a group of related diaries.  I can start it for you with a simple statement ("this diary is for gs and those who want to take a deep constructive look into risk assessment"), if starting a new diary is a problem for you for whatever reason (you've done harder things).

I personally have a different take: I think that, after a certain point, "more precise risk assessment" won't take us much further because it won't change minds or tell us what to do.  But there may be other opinions, and there'd be room to explore that in that diary or series of diaries.

I'm personally glad we're many, diverse and stubbornly independent of each other.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
individual + government

not me. Would they listen to me ?
CDC should do it. Or WHO. Or just some group of scientists,
writing a paper and researching risk-statements.

as the base for risk-management by governments.
How much money to spend for panflu-preparation.

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
We could set out how such a risk assessment might be carried out.
We all make our own vague assessments based on what's happening in the news stories. It's made up of frequency of outbreaks, types of outbreaks, political elements, preparedness, etc.

We could debate what events and actions increses or decreases our vulnerability.


[ Parent ]
yes we can debate all that
or we can go out there and take action.  This comment is not directed at you but in general.  With the amount of uncertainty inherent in the issue, it's a futile exercise to try to go beyond the approximate estimates that each of us have in our minds.  Anything more than that, at least for me, takes way too much of our precious time.  Time that we can spend on working on solutions and helping people to prepare.

I admire gs for his perseverance and his dedication towards finding out the truth.  I just don't believe it's a good use of my time.  Speaking only for myself of course.  To explain why I no longer engage in some of the conversations on this issue.  Just my 2C



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
But actions are proprtionate to credibility
and GS is right, everyone wants to know how likely an H5N1 or 1918 style pandemic is. If you can't answer that or give a measure of how far away might be, they'll just ignore you.

You don't need a definition of risk because you're already convinced. But even you must relax a little as the summer lull kicks in or tense up whenever a cluster appears.

It's a dodgy ground to define what is or isn't worth debating because  


[ Parent ]
many have already reached the point where they can't even bother
visiting the site.

It may be the time for action but some wonder if there's any point.

Sorry about the split post.


[ Parent ]
no I'm not debating what is or is not worth debating
I'm just saying there's a limit to certainty and beyond a certain point, the pursuits have much diminished returns for the efforts put in.

Here's the bottomline that I use, that is the quote from Angus Nicoll, that the risk of a pandemic is 100%.  And the quote from WHO, that the world may be on the brink.  Plus the fact that the most devastating pandemic in the 20th century was caused by an avian virus, and H5N1 is the only avian virus that has consistently been able to infect humans to cause severe disease and is now beginning to go h2h.  How much more accurate do people need to get to prepare?  Just like hurricanes and snowstorms, predictions have limited value beyond a rough estimate of risk.

In addition, I have from day 1 held the view that even a 1% or 2% pandemic is devastating.  Read what I wrote about there's no such thing as a mild pandemic.  That being the case, my actions do not have to be dictated by whether a pandemic is imminent or not.  It lies in the fact that pandemics are dangerous things and prior to now we as human society have not woken up to the danger and therefore there are no existing policies or habits or awareness to prepare for them.  Which means not only much work needs to be done, but more crucially, whatever we do has the chance of leading the way if not setting the standard, for a whole generation to come.

If people believe that a severe pandemic is unlikely, I can show to them exactly how bad a 'mild' pandemic is and therefore they need to prepare, irrespective of whether a severe pandemic is coming our way or not.

So, here's my risk assessment.  It is same as Angus Nicoll's.  The risk of a pandemic is 100%.  The preparation needed for society to remain stable will require at least another 5 years.  For the whole world to not fall apart?  Maybe 10 if we are lucky.  I look at H5N1 with a huge sense of urgency because of that, and it is independent of whether it is going to go pandemic tomorrow.  If that happens tomorrow, we're screwed.  If it happens next year, we are not much better off.  If we work extremely hard now, we may make a difference 5 years from now if the virus holds off for that long.

Hence, I don't need more accurate predictions than what already exists.  There are those who say they need more certainty of a pandemic in order to justify action (and I'm not talking about gs or anyone here, but officials and others) These are the ones who will never get convinced until the day it happens.  

I don't personally have a greater need to define it more closely apart from as you say watching the news.  The point for me is whatever we do now, if a pandemic does not happen in the next few years, still sets the direction for preparedness for the next 20 ir not 50 years.

That's my risk assessment.  Take it for what it's worth.  ;-)



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
Angus Nicoll ... and others
you only pick from the data, what serves your concept.

But politicians must consider all the conflicting predictions.
E.g. the actuaries give a 0.2% probability
of a pandemic worse than 1918.

Address/attack/debate/discuss the conflicting different estimates !
(instead of ignoring them)

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
how do you know that politicians are not using other predictions?
or a range of predictions.  Do you know what they are using? If yes, can you share with us?  Sources?

If not, and if there's no way for us to find out, then, again, all this talk here is just talk.  Apologies for being blunt, but if the top experts in the world have given their opinions, then governments will decide what they decide based on their interpretation of such opinions.  

If they are not convinced, you can try and go convince them.  But saying that scientists need to give you even more data is not helpful, cos they have already done that.  If these are not to your satisfaction, it still doesn't mean that they haven't done it.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
action
risk assessment debate will (hopefully) determine how much money
there is for your "actions".
And antivirals, vaccines, protective equipment.

We cannot decide this without knowledge in virology, research,experiments.
How likely are H1N1-H5N1 reassortments or swine-H5N1-epidemics going to humans,
how likely mutations and acquisition of multiple human polymorphisms ?
How important is weather,geography for pandemic spread, what do the models say, etc.
This cannot be decided by "normal" people.

First the experts should cooperate and not compete and increase their communication
by sharing data and assigning subjective probabilities to their opinions
and suggested preparedness investments.

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
virologists should not suggest preparedness investment (not for my home, anyway)


You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
who then decides that ?
you wouldn't even know about the panflu-threat without
the public warnings from virologists

Now let them figure out and suggest how much investment on
average personal preparedness is appropriate.

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
yes they have done their warnings
I don't understand the need for even more predictions.    



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
this is what an emergency person told me about "who decides what"
The weather man tells you that, within the next 12 hours, high speed winds are to be expected.

You, as the owner of the airline, decide what's best for your planes, crews and, yes, passengers of all ages.

If the weather man is not sure, it's still your decision.

I don't see Taubenberger having much to do with my pantry, the hospitals around my area, a how-to for simple masks, etc, etc, etc, etc.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
HAH I like that quote
I don't see Taubenberger having much to do with my pantry, the hospitals around my area, a how-to for simple masks, etc, etc, etc, etc.

I may just send it to him!!  I'm sure he'll be pleased that you don't hold him responsible for what's in your pantry!



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
he won't like it
so, the message would be that he could figure out and
write anything, we wouldn't care anyway ??
Remember, Webster did make concrete pantry recommendations

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
virologists should be good virologists
and, that said, whatever they choose to say or not say about pantries (or about preparedness in general) is their individual choice.

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
in short, it's a free world
they don't owe us anything, other than what their job description requires.

I've just been reading Fineberg.  http://www.journals.uchicago.e...  He's a most eloquent speaker and writer. Here's what he wrote, in the context of the need to constantly review our progress and programs:

Laying the basis for program review means being explicit about assumptions and scrutinizing their foundations, which will require sensitivity to well-meaning personal agendas that shape perspective, as well as to the institutional and bureaucratic impulses to control and manage.

It also will require candor about the limitations of expert knowledge and a recognition that often what you do not know will not hurt you nearly as much as what you confidently believe to be true but just is not.

I believe we can all learn from his advice....



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
I'm not responsible if you send it! LOL


You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.

[ Parent ]
LOL
no, they won't listen to me either (not that I've tried contacting CDC or WHO)

and yes, maybe a group of scientists could (not "should") write such a paper, or maybe it's been done each time the World Bank writes there could be financial problems of such and such magnitude

how much money to spend = more than has been spent

and it's not all about money

(gotta run)

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
they have written such papers
and given their opinions.  The consensus opinion is they cannot predict it.  Here's a couple of them.

Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1): a Threat to Human Health J. S. Malik Peiris,1,2* Menno D. de Jong,3 and Yi Guan1

The Next Influenza Pandemic: Can It Be Predicted? Taubenberger JK, Morens DM, Fauci AS.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
i "should" write a wikipage about probabilities, assessments etc
but i don't have time right now

(maybe it's already written)

never mind

You arm yourself to the teeth just in case.  You don't leave the gun near the baby's hand.


[ Parent ]
that is precisely my point LOL
but i don't have time right now

Anyone who is doing work on making change will soon find themselves having to triage their time very heavily if not ruthlessly.  There's just too much to do and therefore this is going to rank low on the list of priorities.



All 'safety concerns' are hypothetical.  If not, they'd be called side effects...


[ Parent ]
no numbers, no referrence to the economy-people, the insurances
no numbers were given in the papers.

> An H5N1 pandemic is an event of low probability but one of high human health impact
(but co-author Peiris said in another statement that he considers a pandemic within the next
10 years as extremely likely)

and about the Taubenberger,Morens,Fauci paper see this thread:
http://www.newfluwiki2.com/sho...

ask experts for their subjective
panflu death expectation values
and report the replies


[ Parent ]
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